In this paper, we experimentally investigate the effects of budget-based contracts and budget levels (performance targets) on group performance. We compare a group piece-rate contract with two different specifications of a group budget-based contract: (1) a group budget-fixed contract that provides no remuneration for performance below the budget and a fixed bonus for performance meeting or exceeding the budget, and (2) a group budget-linear contract that provides no remuneration for performance below the budget, a fixed bonus once the budget is attained, plus a piecerate for production in excess of the budget. We also assigned each group a budget level, set at 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of the group's performance capability. The results indicate that the group budget-linear contract led to significantly higher group performance than both the group budget-fixed contract and the group piece-rate contract. Additionally, the 75 percent budget level led to significantly higher group performance than both the 50 percent budget level and the 100 percent budget level. Finally, the variability in group performance was lowest under the group budgetlinear contract and the 75 percent budget level. Collectively, these results demonstrate the efficacy of both certain types of budget-based contracts and ''moderately'' difficult budget goals in enhancing group performance. The results also suggest that both motivation and coordination (planning) can be enhanced by budget levels of moderate difficulty and group budget-linear contracts, as the group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level not only led to the highest level of performance, but also led to the lowest variability in performance.
INTRODUCTION
A lmost all organizations employ workgroups or teams.
1 In a group setting, output reflects the collective efforts of multiple individuals (Prendergast 1999) . Numerous organizations link individual compensation to group outcomes, and the use of group incentives has increased over the past 50 years (Blinder 1999) . For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 413) state:
Almost all of the formal theory emphasizes incentives for individuals on the grounds that it is individuals who must be motivated to work. Yet the most common explicit incentive contracts are applied across groups of employees. The performance of the whole group together determines the total incentive payment, and the total is usually divided among individuals according to formulas or criteria that do not depend on individual performance.
Group incentives frequently are desirable because of the cost and difficulty associated with measuring and evaluating individual performance (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Holmström 1982) . Group incentives also may dissuade individuals from maximizing their own performance measures at the expense of collective efficiency.
2 Group incentives engender several control costs, however. Of these, free-riding (social loafing) is perhaps the most frequently discussed collective action problem. Group incentives may motivate employees to shirk and reap the benefit of other group members' output, thereby decreasing overall group performance and firm profit.
One class of incentive schemes that has been studied in accounting is budget-based incentive contracts where compensation is tied to achieving a budget level/target (see, e.g., Merchant 1998) . Organizations routinely employ budgeting systems and link compensation to budget attainment-such group-based contracts are used extensively in practice (Murphy 2001; Henderson 2000; Lawler 2000; Umapathy 1987 ). While many budgets are set at the group level, prior research tends to focus on how budgets affect individual productivity (see, e.g., Bonner et al. 2000) . Group budgets, however, introduce issues related to coordination and cooperation that may modify results found at the individual level. Moreover, it is unclear whether budget-based contracts are superior to other contracts (e.g., group piece-rate contracts) in a group setting and, if so, what form the contract should take.
Our first research question addresses the effect of group budget-based contracts on group performance. We examine three different group incentive schemes. The first contract is a group piece-rate contract that rewards all positive levels of group production and pays a constant amount for each unit of group output. The second contract is a group budgetfixed contract that pays no remuneration for performance below the budget and a fixed bonus once the group budget is attained; no further compensation is paid for performance 1 After reviewing more than 80 characterizations of a group, Shaw (1976, 446 ) defines a group as ''two or more persons who are interacting with one another in such a manner that each person influences and is influenced by each other person.'' Groups may be formal or informal, and many researchers make no distinction between groups and teams (Hare et al. 1996) . 2 Organizing production in teams also can result in benefits due to improved coordination of information, skills, effort, mutual monitoring, and improved risk sharing (Balakrishnan et al. 1998; Arya et al. 1997; Itoh 1991; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1991; Alchian and Demsetz 1972) .
above the budget. The third contract is a group budget-linear contract that pays no remuneration for performance below the budget, a fixed amount for budget attainment, and a linear amount (as under the group piece-rate contract) for each unit produced above the budget.
In constructing a budget-based contract, it is necessary to set a budget level (performance target/goal). Our second research question, therefore, addresses the effect of budget level on group performance. Much goal-setting research documents that goal levels are positively related to performance until goals become excessively difficult (participants reach the limits of their ability), at which point performance levels off (see Locke and Latham 1990, 27-28) . Most of the research supporting this proposition, however, involves individuals working in a single-person and single-shot setting without explicit rewards for performance or opportunities to engage in other profitable activities (see Bandura 1997, 133-134) . We examine the robustness of this finding to a multiperiod group setting that contains explicit rewards for engaging in both work (production) and leisure (perquisite consumption) activities.
We employ a controlled laboratory experiment to examine the effects of alternative group incentive contracts and group budget levels on group performance. Participants in our experiment were randomly assigned to two-person workgroups in one of nine betweensubjects treatment conditions. The nine between-subjects treatment conditions were obtained by crossing three group compensation conditions (group piece-rate, group budgetfixed, and group budget-linear) with three group budget levels (easy, moderate, and difficult). In each of eight independent periods, participants were endowed with three minutes of time that they allocated between work and compensated leisure. Participants used work time to generate group output (performance), and group output equaled the sum of the two employees' individual output.
The results indicate that the group budget-linear contract led to significantly higher group performance than both the group piece-rate contract and the group budget-fixed contract (performance was not significantly different between the group piece-rate and group budget-fixed contracts). We also found that the moderate budget level led to significantly higher group performance than both the easy and difficult budget levels (performance was not significantly different between easy and difficult budget levels). Additionally, group performance tended to decrease (decay) over the work periods. The decay rate for the group budget-linear contract was significantly less than the decay rates for the other two contracts. Likewise, moderate budget targets resulted in lower decay rates than easy or difficult budget targets. Finally, we found that the variability in group performance was lowest under the group budget-linear contract and the moderate budget level.
These results have several important implications. First, our results indicate that budgetbased contracts lead to higher group performance than piece-rate contracts in our group setting. Second, our results demonstrate that the form of the budget-based contract can affect group performance-budget-based contracts that have equivalent equilibrium strategies do not necessarily lead to equivalent behavior and outcomes. Third, our study provides insights into how various budget levels (performance targets) affect group performance. In contrast to much goal-setting research (see Locke and Latham 1990) , our findings suggest that group budgets should be set at moderate levels rather than at difficult (or easy) levels. In this regard, our results complement the findings of Merchant and Manzoni's (1989) field study documenting that budgets empirically tend to be set at moderately difficult levels. Finally, our results suggest that both motivation and coordination (planning) likely are enhanced by group budget levels of moderate difficulty and group budget-linear contracts, as the group budget-linear contract and moderate budget level not only led to the highest level of performance, but also led to the lowest variability in performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Section two develops the hypotheses, and section three explains the methods that are employed to test the hypotheses. Section four presents the results, and section five provides a summary and discussion of the results.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES Setting
Assume there is a group of size n that works on a production task, where group output equals the sum of individual output.
3 Individual output is a function of the amount of time spent working, and each group member knows their effort-performance mapping (i.e., there is no individual-level performance uncertainty). 4 Further, each group member is endowed with a certain amount of time that s/he can allocate to work or leisure, and workers not only derive utility from compensation but also derive utility from leisure consumption. In this setting, each group member has to decide on the amount of time to allocate between work and leisure. Finally, the superior observes group output but is unaware of individual output (Holmström 1982) .
Group incentive schemes, which reward individuals based on group outcomes, frequently are employed when group output is observable but individual performance is unobservable (Blinder 1999; Holmström 1982) . This raises a question regarding the type of group incentive schemes organizations should employ to motivate individual employees to allocate time to increasing group productivity. In this paper, we examine the efficacy of three group-based incentive schemes: a group piece-rate contract and two budget-based contracts. We selected these contracts, described below, because of their theoretical importance and their common use in practice and research (see, e.g., Murphy 2001; Atkinson et al. 2001; Henderson 2000; Lawler 2000; Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Holmström 1982; Demski and Feltham 1978) . For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1992, 413-418) and Henderson (2000, Chapter 14) discuss the extensive empirical use of group piece-rate (e.g., profit sharing) and group budget-based (e.g., gain sharing) compensation plans. 5 3 Such output specifications have been employed (assumed) in much previous research examining groups (see, e.g., Balakrishnan et al. 1998; Arya et al. 1997; Nalbantian and Shotter 1997; Ledyard 1995) . 4 The correlation between individual effort (time spent working) and individual performance (output) in our experiment ϭ .97 (p Ͻ 0.01). This design feature ensures that our setting contains only uncertainty regarding what others will do, allowing us to focus squarely on group cooperation and coordination issues that are not confounded with individual-level uncertainty regarding how much [personal] production will result from a given level of effort. This also explains why our hypotheses focus on group performance rather than both group effort and group performance (i.e., the results related to work-time allocations across budget levels and incentive schemes are almost identical to those regarding group performance). See Holmström (1982) for a discussion regarding the theoretical efficacy of certain budget-based contracts when the relation between individual effort and performance is uncertain. 5 There are similarities between the group production setting we examine and a public goods setting. Group output is a kind of public good that is shared equally by the workers. The group piece-rate scheme we examine shares certain features with public goods provision through a voluntary contribution mechanism (Ledyard 1995; Isaac et al. 1984) . Additionally, public goods experiments have examined how individual contributions are affected by the existence of a provision point or threshold (Isaac et al. 1989) . While the public goods literature provides useful insights and a foundation for examining group contracting issues, there are several reasons why research is needed that focuses particularly on group production settings and group incentive schemes. First, there are variations in the skills and abilities of individuals who compose a work group. These variations, which may engender equity and fairness issues, do not exist in the typical public goods experiment as participants usually are endowed with the same level of initial resources. Second, public goods research typically employs large (continued on next page)
Incentive Contracts
Group Piece-Rate Incentive Scheme The group piece-rate (e.g., profit-sharing) scheme pays each group member a piecerate of b Ͼ 0 for each unit of group output. Group members not only receive utility from the piece-rate for output but also receive utility from consuming leisure time. Assume that each group member can be paid for this leisure time in an ''individual exchange'' and receives a payment of a Ͼ 0 for each leisure time unit consumed. For expositional simplicity, assume group members produce one output unit for each time unit allocated to work. An individual's total payoff under the group piece-rate scheme equals the sum of the piece-rate payment plus the payoff from leisure time consumption, as shown in Equation (1): 
Group Budget-Fixed Incentive Scheme
The second contract we examine is a group budget-fixed (bang-bang) contract (Demski and Feltham 1978) . This contract is nonlinear-no compensation is paid for group performance below the budget target, and a fixed bonus is paid when the budget is achieved; further performance above the budget is not compensated. We define the contract such that the budget target is nonzero. For comparison purposes, assume the bonus amount is equal to the piece-rate parameter (b) multiplied by the budget target. This contract is shown in Equation (2):
where:
D ϭ 1 if group output is equal to or greater than the budget target; 0 otherwise; and C ϭ fixed bonus amount; C ϭ (b ϫ budget target).
All other variables are as defined in Equation (1).
Footnote 5, continued group sizes (minimum of 4 and up to 100), whereas analytic contracting research in accounting and economics (and our study) focuses on groups of two. Third, we examine budget-based incentive schemes that are different from typical threshold incentives in the public good setting (e.g., a group budget-fixed contract). Finally, as noted by Ledyard (1995) , there is not much evidence examining whether thresholds increase contributions to public goods and the results that do exist have not been consistent (see, e.g., Rapoport and Suleiman 1993; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; Isaac et al. 1989; Marwell and Ames 1980) .
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Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 Group Budget-Linear Incentive Scheme The third contract we examine is a group budget-linear contract. Similar to the group budget-fixed contract, this contract provides no compensation for group performance below the budget target and a fixed bonus amount once the budget target is achieved. However, unlike the group budget-fixed contract but similar to the group piece-rate contract, the group budget-linear contract pays a linear amount for every unit produced above the budget. Again, the budget target is nonzero (differentiating this contract from the group piece-rate contract). This contract is shown in Equation (3):
where all variables are as defined in Equations (1) and (2).
Algebraically, contract remuneration under the three incentive schemes falls on the same line when graphing individual or group compensation by group production. Thus, if a group exactly attains its budget target, then compensation is identical under all three incentive schemes. For group production above the budget target, the group piece-rate and group budget-linear contracts provide identical remuneration, which strictly exceeds remuneration under the group budget-fixed contract. For group production below the budget target but greater than zero, the group budget-fixed and group budget-linear contracts provide identical remuneration ($0), whereas the group piece-rate contract provides strictly positive remuneration. Figure 1 depicts the three incentive contracts.
Hypotheses
Incentive Scheme
Our first hypothesis addresses the effect of the incentive scheme on group performance. Under a group piece-rate contract, the motivation of the employee to pursue either work or leisure is a function of the relative levels of a and b. If b Ͼ a, then the employee should allocate all time to work. If a Ͼ b, then the employee is motivated to put all time toward leisure. However, if b Ͻ a Ͻ bn (n equals group size), then total group pay (efficiency) is maximized when all employees allocate all of their time to work even though each individual employee is better off allocating all time to leisure. We examine a setting where b Ͻ a Ͻ bn because of the interesting tension between individual and group strategies.
For example, assume a ϭ .75, b ϭ .50, and n ϭ 2 (thus, b Ͻ a Ͻ bn), and that each group member can produce 40 output units in 40 units of available time. If both group members invest all their time in leisure then each group member earns 40 ϫ .75 ϭ 30. Alternatively, if both group members invest all their time in work then each group member earns ((40 ϩ 40) ϫ .50) ϭ 40. Thus, working leads to higher total group (and individual) pay and efficiency than shirking.
Notice, however, that each group member is monetarily better off by shirking rather than working. For example, if the first group member allocated all time to leisure while the second group member allocated all time to work then group member 1 earns (40 ϫ .75) ϩ (40 ϫ .50) ϭ 50 (rather than 40), while group member 2 earns 40 ϫ .50 ϭ 20 (rather than 40). In turn, group member 2 also prefers to shirk rather than work (thereby increasing pay to 30). In short, free-riding is a dominant strategy under the group piecerate scheme, although the most efficient outcome is one where both participants are working.
Thus, while the group piece-rate scheme rewards all positive levels of group output and maximizes group pay when all employees are working, the scheme essentially sets up 
Group Production
We examine three group incentive contracts: group piece-rate, group budget-fixed, and group budget-linear. The group piece-rate contract (b and d above) rewards all positive levels of group production and pays a constant amount for each unit of group output. The group budget-fixed contract (a and c above) pays $0 for performance below the group budget target and a fixed amount (bonus) if the budget target is achieved or exceeded (additional performance above the budget target is not compensated). The group budget-linear contract (a and d above) pays $0 for performance below the budget target, a fixed amount (bonus) when the target is achieved, and a linear amount (as under the group piece-rate contract) for every unit of group production above the budget target. a Prisoner's Dilemma game and theoretically leads to high levels of free riding. As noted previously, when b Ͻ a Ͻ bn, employees are motivated to allocate all time to leisure. This occurs because under the group piece-rate scheme the incremental benefit from exerting effort (b) is less than the incremental benefit from consuming leisure (a). Moreover, the dominant strategy (Nash) equilibrium under the piece-rate contract is characterized by group members allocating all their time to leisure, thereby leading to zero group production.
Group budget-based contracts Equations (2) and (3), on the other hand, have Nash equilibria that involve positive work-time allocations, and these equilibria are Paretosuperior to full leisure consumption (Holmström 1982) . This occurs because the discontinuity in pay that exists under budget-based contracts can change the incremental benefit of working. Specifically, assume that other members of a group are working and that the Fisher, Peffer, and Sprinkle 
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Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 marginal worker, by allocating all time to work, is able to ensure that the group budget will be met and that pay for each group member will equal b ϫ budget target. If the marginal worker does not exert effort, however, the group budget will not be met and incentive pay will equal $0. In this case, the benefit to working, b ϫ budget target, can strictly exceed the benefit from leisure, or a ϫ T i . Working is therefore sustainable as a Nash equilibrium (mutual best reply).
For example, assume that (as before) a ϭ .75, b ϭ .50, n ϭ 2, and that each group member can produce 40 output units in 40 units of available time. Additionally, assume that the group budget target equals 80. If the first group member is producing O 1 ϭ 40, then the benefit to the second group member for producing 40 units to reach the budget equals 80 ϫ .50 ϭ 40, which strictly exceeds the cost of 40 ϫ .75 ϭ 30 (thus, both group members receive 40). Further, in contrast to the group piece-rate contract, if the second group member allocated all time to leisure and the first group member allocated all time to work, then the second group member would receive 40 ϫ .75 ϭ 30 (and, the first group member would receive 0 since the budget has not been met). In this case, both group members are better off working rather than shirking.
Notice, however, that if the first group member is producing O 1 Ͻ 40, then the budget target is not attainable by any possible production from the second group member (since maximum individual production is 40). In this case, the second group member's best reply is to allocate all time to leisure. Given this, the first group member prefers to shirk rather than work.
Thus, the two budget-based contracts contain two Nash equilibria: worker contributions equal to the budget target (working equilibrium) and full leisure allocation (leisure equilibrium).
6 Full leisure allocation, however, is Pareto dominated by group output equal to the budget target (i.e., as illustrated above, each group member's total pay is higher in the latter case because a Ͻ bn). Relying on this Pareto dominance, we posit that group budget-based contracts will lead to higher work-time allocations and subsequent group performance than the group piece-rate contract.
The two budget-based contracts result in identical Nash equilibria because group outcomes equal to the budget or zero production are the only Nash equilibria. However, prior research has shown that off-equilibrium incentives can affect individual and group behavior (see, e.g., Ledyard 1995) . In our setting, compensation paid beyond the budget target is an off-equilibrium incentive. The group budget-fixed contract provides no additional compensation for performance above the budget, whereas the group budget-linear contract does. Consequently, we posit that the group budget-linear contract will lead to higher group performance than the group budget-fixed contract because excess production ''errors'' are 6 It is possible to have the group achieve the budget, but the outcome not be a Nash equilibrium. This can occur when work-time allocations differ greatly among team members. For example, assume the budget is set at a low level and is achieved by having one group member allocate all time to work and all other group members allocating their time to leisure. The working group member may be better off by allocating all time to leisure. Additionally, production above the budget target is not sustainable as a Nash equilibrium under either budgetbased contract. This occurs under the group budget-fixed contract because production in excess of the budget target is not compensated; under the group budget-linear contract, production above the budget-target is compensated on a piece-rate basis and, isomorphic to the group piece-rate contract, the constant marginal benefit of an extra unit of effort, b, is strictly less than the constant marginal cost of an extra unit of effort, a (under the group budget-fixed contract, a ϭ 0).
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In sum, the positive work-time Nash equilibria under the group budget-based contracts imply higher group performance for the group budget-based contracts than the group piecerate contract. Additionally, given the off-equilibrium incentives under the group budget-based contracts, we posit that group performance will be higher under the group budget-linear contract than under the group budget-fixed contract. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1:
The group budget-linear contract will result in the highest level of group performance, followed by the group budget-fixed contract and the group piece-rate contract.
Notice that Hypothesis 1 is framed in terms of group performance and not owner welfare. We assume a competitive output market where the revenue per unit is constant and greater than bn. Consequently, total firm returns available as payments to employees or owners are maximized at full production (i.e., available surplus increases as production increases). This implies that, ceteris paribus, the owner strictly prefers the group budgetbased contracts to the group piece-rate contract (for any given level of production, the piece-rate contract provides the upper bound for pay). Moreover, if production under the group budget-based contracts exceeds production under the group piece-rate contract, then the owner's net payoff is always higher under the group budget-based contracts than under the group piece-rate contract. 8 Comparing the owner's welfare between the two group budget-based contracts is more problematic given the discontinuity in pay. For example, depending on the revenue per unit, the owner may prefer a group to miss its budget target by one unit than to exactly meet its budget target. We revisit this issue in the results section (please see footnote 18).
Budget Level
As shown in Equations (2) and (3), budget-based contracts require a budget target/ level. Budget targets or, more generally, assigned goals are thought to be an important element of an organization's control system (Merchant 1998) . Organizations routinely attempt to motivate employees via explicit profit goals, return on investment goals, sales revenue goals, and production cost goals (Merchant 1998) . In employing budget targets, a question naturally arises regarding the level at which they should be set (e.g., easy to achieve or difficult to achieve).
Under the group piece-rate scheme, there are no financial incentives associated with meeting the budget target. In other words, budget targets do not change the remuneration ''game'' being played among workers. Accordingly, the Nash equilibrium does not differ across budget levels-workers should ignore the assigned targets, and production should 7 Ample prior research examining public goods provision problems documents significant contributions to a public good (Ledyard 1995) . However, contributions to the public goods typically are less than 50 percent of the Paretoefficient level, especially when the experiment is repeated (Ledyard 1995, 121 ). Since the lowest budget level we examine is 50 percent of the Pareto-efficient level, we posit that the group budget-fixed contract will lead to higher effort and performance than the group piece-rate contract. 8 Under the group piece-rate contract the owner receives a constant residual amount per unit, whereas under either group budget-based contract the owner receives at least this amount per unit. Thus, if output is higher under the group budget-based contracts, then the owner's net payoff is always higher. Conversely, if production is greater under the group piece-rate contract than under the group budget-based contracts, then it does not immediately follow that the owner's welfare is higher under the group piece-rate contract. It is possible for production to be higher under the group piece-rate contract but the budget-based contract to yield higher pay to the owner-this may occur when the owner does not have to pay a bonus.
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Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 be invariant to the budget level. As discussed earlier, participants under the group piecerate scheme are financially motivated to put all time to leisure-budget levels do not perturb this equilibrium. Under the two group budget-based contracts, there are financial incentives associated with meeting the budget target, and the remuneration ''game'' being played among workers depends on the budget level. Ceteris paribus, output and compensation increase with increases in the budget level. That is, if participants opt to play the working equilibrium where work contributions equal the budget target (rather than the leisure equilibrium), then increasing the budget target increases firm and employee welfare. Notwithstanding the Nash predictions, there is a vast literature that empirically examines how assigned goals affect effort and performance (see Locke and Latham 1990 ). This research documents that assigned goals per se are motivational mechanisms and enhance effort and performance by positively influencing an individual's performance expectations and aspirations (personal goals). That is, assigned goals are accepted and internalized as personal goals independent of compensation. In turn, as an individual's standard increases, motivation (effort) and performance also increase.
A large number of empirical studies and meta-analyses document a linear relationship between the degree of goal difficulty and performance ''except when subjects reach the limits of their ability at high goal difficulty levels; in such cases the function levels off'' (Locke and Latham 1990, 27 ; see also Latham and Locke 1991; Tubbs 1986) .
10 Additionally, group members have been shown to internalize group budget targets even when there is no financial incentive for doing so (Earley and Lituchy 1990) . Moreover, in summarizing the extensive literature on goals Locke and Latham (1990, 45-46) note that, ''given all of 9 It is not clear that the same proportion of groups will play the working equilibrium as the budget level increases under the group budget-based contracts. In this regard, Isaac et al. (1989) note the possibility of ''assurance problem'' and ''focal point'' equilibria in public goods provision games. In our setting, the focal point equilibrium results in group production equal to the budget target and is consistent with a working equilibrium. An assurance problem equilibrium results in zero production and is consistent with a leisure equilibrium. Although the budget level may serve as a focal point for play (Schelling 1960 ) and all of the budget levels we examine are achievable if group members commit to working, a budget attainment ''assurance'' problem increases as the budget level increases because each individual group member needs to rely more on the production of other group members. If a group member is uncertain about what others will produce and the budget level does not change these beliefs, then increasing the budget level while holding one's own production constant reduces the probability that working hard will result in budget attainment. Consequently, while absolute pay increases as the budget level increases (assuming the budget is attained), expected pay may decrease with increases in the budget level (risk aversion would exacerbate the problem). Of course, this relation depends on each group member's beliefs about others' behavior in the context of the budget level and contract, including beliefs about others' beliefs and risk preferences. Moreover, the reduced ability of any one group member to ''buffer'' against the possible shirking of others by increasing their own production as the budget level increases could destabilize the focal point equilibrium, ultimately leading to the zero production (''assurance'' problem) equilibrium. 10 Locke and Latham (1990, Chapter 2) refer to this as a ''core finding of goal-setting research.'' Others, though, question the generality of this result. For example, Merchant (1998, 387) states, ''At high levels of [goal] difficulty, most people get discouraged, lose their commitment to achieve the target, and exert less effort.' ' Bandura (1997, 133-134 ) also suggests a similar curvilinear relation stating, ''The generality of the evidence for unshaken pursuit of unreachable goals must be qualified, however, by the fact that laboratory simulations may differ from everyday conditions in several important respects. The simulation usually involves only brief effort, failure carries no costs, and no opportunities exist for alternative pursuits.'' In our study, all group budgets are set at achievable levels (as perceived by participants). Consequently, we do not examine the effect of goal difficulty on performance for budget targets that are above participants' ability levels. The effect of goal difficulty on performance for group targets above perceived ability levels is beyond the scope of our study. In sum, prior goal-setting research suggests that work-time allocations and subsequent performance will increase as the budget level increases. This is consistent with Nash predictions for the budget-based contracts but not for the group piece-rate contract. Notwithstanding the Nash predictions, we posit that performance will be positively correlated with the budget level. Indeed, prior research tends to show that goals and monetary incentives have independent (additive), positive effects on performance (see, e.g., Bonner and Sprinkle 2002, 325-329) . This leads to our second hypothesis: H2: Group performance will increase with increases in the budget level.
METHOD Participants and Design
One hundred eighty-eight undergraduate students enrolled in intermediate accounting at a large university participated in our experiment. We randomly assigned participants to two-person workgroups and to one of nine between-subjects treatment conditions. We obtained the nine between-subjects treatment conditions by fully crossing three group compensation conditions (incentive contracts) with three group budget levels (targets).
First, we assigned participants to one of three compensation conditions (incentive contracts). The three incentive contracts were the group piece-rate, group budget-fixed, and group budget-linear schemes described in Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. Second, we assigned participants to one of three group budget levels (targets). We set group budget targets at ''easy,'' ''intermediate,'' and ''difficult'' levels. Finally, participants in all nine between-subjects conditions completed eight work sessions. Thus, our experiment employs a 3 ϫ 3 ϫ 8 mixed factorial design, with incentive contract and budget level as betweensubjects factors and period as a within-subjects factor. Participants completed the entire experiment via computer.
Procedure
The experimental procedure comprised 12 steps:
1. We partitioned the computer lab into two sections using a solid room partition. When participants arrived, we randomly assigned them to computer terminals, with one-half of the participants seated on each side of the partition. We informed participants that they would be randomly matched with another participant on the other side of the partition, and that this person would be their group member for the entire experiment.
12 11 There are some salient differences between our research setting and prior studies examining the relation between goals and performance. In particular, the vast majority of goal-setting studies have used the individual as the unit of analysis and Locke and Latham (1990, 46) provide a caveat regarding the generalizability of goal-setting theory at the group level. Specifically, they note that ''one would expect more contingencies and complexities at the group level than at the individual level, but these have not as yet been thoroughly studied ...'' Some of the complexities that are present in our setting include an explicit coordination problem in attempting to attain the budget target that cannot be mitigated via pre-play communication, explicit rewards for perquisite (leisure) consumption, and the repeated nature of our production setting. 12 We set the group size at two for several reasons. First, analytic research in accounting and economics tends to focus on groups of this size because it is the minimum number necessary to explore team issues. Second, a group size of two allows for some mutual monitoring because there is no uncertainty regarding each group member's output. Finally, a group size of two allows us to obtain the largest number of groups from our limited subject pool, thereby maximizing the power of our statistical tests.
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All participants then completed a brief practice session to ensure they understood the task and its requirements. 3. We informed participants that they would earn ''francs'' during the training and work sessions and that each franc would be converted to dollars at the rate of one cent per franc. We informed participants that the total amount of money they earned during the experiment would be paid to them in cash at the conclusion of the experiment. 4. Participants completed three three-minute training sessions to further familiarize themselves with the task and learn their performance capabilities. Participants earned three francs for each item correctly decoded and received a running total of the number of items correctly and incorrectly decoded. After each training session, participants received individual summary information regarding the number of items they attempted, correctly decoded, and incorrectly decoded. 5. After the third (last) training session, we asked participants for their best estimate of the number of items they could correctly decode in a three-minute work session. We used these estimates to calculate group budget levels (performance targets), and we constrained these estimates to be no less than the greatest number of items the participant correctly decoded in any of the three training sessions. 14 6. The next computer screens described the work sessions. We informed participants that there would be eight work sessions and that they would receive a group performance target before the first work session. We informed participants that the group performance target would remain the same for each of the eight work sessions. Next, we informed participants about how their group performance target was calculated. Specifically, we informed participants in the ''easy,'' ''moderate,'' and ''difficult'' budget goal conditions that their group performance targets would be 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent, respectively, of the sum of both group members' estimates of their performance capabilities. 15 7. We informed participants that before each work session, each group member would have 180 seconds to allocate to either ''work'' (decoding time) or ''leisure'' time. We then informed participants of their group compensation scheme. These schemes 13 Following prior public goods experiments (see, e.g., Ledyard [1995] ; Nalbantian and Schotter [1997] ), we informed participants that there would be eight work sessions (periods). 14 Participants' performance estimates were, on average, 6 percent higher than their performance in the third training session. Further, participants did not know that their estimates would be used to calculate group performance targets. 15 In the goal-setting literature (Locke and Latham 1990) , goal levels frequently are defined by reference to each individual subject's performance in a practice session or by reference to a pilot test of similar subjects (Fatseas and Hirst 1992; Erez et al. 1990) . Further, there is no widely accepted definition of what constitutes an ''easy,'' ''moderate,'' or ''difficult'' group goal or, for that matter, individual goal. We set performance targets at 50 percent, 75 percent, and 100 percent of a group's performance capability because 50 percent allowed one group member working alone to achieve the performance target, whereas 100 percent required both group members to work (full coordination); we chose 75 percent as an intermediate target because it is equidistant between the 50 percent and 100 percent levels. Finally, learning may take place over the course of the eight periods and, consequently, perceived budget difficulty may not remain constant. We did not change budget targets because of the difficulty in a priori assessing this learning as well as the difficulty associated with inferring whether behavior is being driven by the current budget target or anticipated changes in the target (ratchet effects).
were described earlier in Equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively, with a ϭ .5 and b ϭ 1.0. We illustrated the incentive contracts via several numerical examples.
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8. We informed participants that after each work session they would learn the number of items they correctly decoded as well as the number of items the other group member correctly decoded and, thus, the total items correctly decoded by the group. We also informed participants that they would be provided with information regarding their pay for the period. 9. Participants answered a series of factual questions about the group budget target, their compensation scheme, the process of allocating time to work and leisure, and the actual work sessions. An incorrect answer on any question automatically returned participants to the explanatory computer screens and then back to the beginning of the questions. These forced manipulation checks ensured that participants understood all relevant aspects of the task and their particular treatment condition before beginning the first work session. 10. We informed participants of the performance capability of both group members and provided them with their group performance target for each of the work sessions. 11. Participants performed eight consecutive work sessions. For each work session, we reminded participants of their group performance target. Participants then allocated 180 seconds to either work or leisure time and performed the decoding task for their chosen work time. Following this, participants learned their own production, group production, and their earnings. 12. After completing the eight work sessions, participants completed an exit questionnaire. Last, we calculated and disbursed participant payments.
RESULTS
Presentation of Experimental Results
We employ the following approach in presenting the experimental results and tests related to H1 and H2. First, we present least-squares means by compensation condition and budget level for our primary dependent measure, group performance.
17 Second, we conduct an ANOVA with group performance as the dependent variable, compensation condition, and budget level as between-subjects factors, and period as the within-subjects (repeated measures) factor. Third, we follow up significant effects from the ANOVA by conducting 16 We determined the parameter values of a ϭ .5 and b ϭ 1.0 in the following way. Via pilot testing we found that an ''average'' participant could decode approximately 68 numbers in a three-minute period (approximately .38 numbers per second). Under the group piece-rate contract, with a ϭ .5 and b ϭ 1, an individual could invest one second in leisure with a return of .5 or invest one second in work with a return of .38. Thus, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) is approximately 75 percent, which is a typical value used in public goods experiments (Ledyard 1995) . Under the group piece-rate scheme, if both participants invested all their time in leisure, then each participant would earn 90 francs for the work session (180 seconds ϫ .5). If both participants invested all their time in work, however, and assuming average capability, then each would each earn 136 francs (68 production units ϫ 2 persons ϫ 1.0 pay per unit). On the other hand, if participant 1 allocated all time to leisure while participant 2 allocated all time to work then participant 1 would earn 158 francs ((180 ϫ .5) ϩ (68 ϫ 1.0)) and participant 2 would earn 68 francs (68 ϫ 1.0). Free riding is thus a dominant strategy under the group piece-rate scheme, although the most efficient outcome is one where both participants are working. Under the group budget-based contracts the bonus was equal to the group budget level (i.e., 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of the group's performance capability). Additionally, under the group budget-linear contract, each participant was paid 1 franc for each unit produced above the budget (identical to the group piece-rate contract). 17 A least squares mean, or population marginal mean, is the arithmetic average of the population cell means for all cells comprising a particular level of a classification variable (i.e., the number of observations in each cell is ignored) (see Searle et al. 1980 
Ͻ0.75
Period ϫ Group (CC ϫ BL) 351,413 595 590 a n ϭ the number of groups in each treatment condition. b The Group (CC ϫ BL) mean square is the appropriate error term for the between-subjects effects. The Period ϫ Group (CC ϫ BL) mean square is the appropriate error term for the within-subjects effects.
planned comparisons suggested by our hypotheses. Finally, we report additional analyses related to period effects (dynamics) and the variance in group performance.
Incentive Contracts (Hypothesis 1)
Hypothesis 1 posits that group performance will be highest under the group budgetlinear contract, lowest under the group piece-rate contract, and at an intermediate level under the group budget-fixed contract. Panel A of Table 1 presents average group performance by compensation condition and budget level, averaged over periods. Consistent with H1, groups receiving the group budget-linear contract had the highest performance (117.14 units), followed by groups receiving the group budget-fixed contract (88.69 units) and groups receiving the group piece-rate contract (80.43 units). Panel B of Table 1 shows that the differences in group performance across compensation conditions are statistically significant (F ϭ 12.43, p Ͻ 0.01).
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Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 Specific comparisons among the incentive contracts revealed that the group budgetlinear contract led to significantly higher group performance than both the group budget-fixed contract (F ϭ 13.51, p Ͻ 0.01) and the group piece-rate contract (F ϭ 22.45, p Ͻ 0.01). Performance under the group budget-fixed contract was not significantly different at conventional levels than performance under the group piece-rate contract (F ϭ 1.12, p Ͻ 0.15). Consequently, we find partial support for H1-the group budget-linear contract results in significantly higher group performance than the other two compensation contracts.
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Budget Level (Hypothesis 2)
Hypothesis 2 posits that group performance will increase as the budget level increases. As shown in Panel A of Table 1 , the results are not entirely consistent with this hypothesis. The mean group performance increases from the 50 percent to the 75 percent budget level (83.32 versus 108.29) but decreases from the 75 percent to the 100 percent budget level (108.29 versus 94.64). Further, this ordering of group performance across budget levels is consistent across compensation conditions-the 75 percent budget level always results in the highest group performance.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that the main effect of budget level is statistically significant (F ϭ 5.28, p Ͻ 0.01). Specific comparisons reveal that the 75 percent budget level led to significantly higher group performance than the 50 percent budget level (F ϭ 10.53, p Ͻ 0.01) and the 100 percent budget level (F ϭ 3.05, p Ͻ 0.04). In addition, the 100 percent budget level led to marginally higher group performance than the 50 percent budget level (F ϭ 2.10, p Ͻ 0.08).
Period Effects (Dynamics)
Panel B of Table 1 indicates that the period main effect, the period-by-compensation condition interaction effect, and a period-by-budget level interaction effect are all statistically significant. Figure 2 presents evidence regarding why these effects are significant.
Panel A of Figure 2 shows average group performance by compensation contract and period, and Panel B of Figure 2 shows average group performance by budget level and period. First, Figure 2 reveals why the period main effect is significant-average group performance decreases over periods. This result is consistent with research documenting that voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time (Ledyard 1995, 121) .
Second, Panel A of Figure 2 reveals why the two compensation condition-by-period interaction effects are significant-the decay in group performance is lower under the group budget-linear contract than under the group budget-fixed contract and the group piece-rate contract. Formal statistical tests support this assertion-when examining pairs of contracts, the compensation condition-by-period interaction effect is significant when comparing the group budget-linear contract with either the group budget-fixed contract or the group piecerate contract (both p's Ͻ 0.05). This interaction effect is not statistically significant, however, when comparing the group budget-fixed contract with the group piece-rate contract (p Ͼ 0.21). 18 As mentioned earlier, the fact that production is higher under the group budget-linear contract than the group piece-rate contract not only implies that efficiency is higher, but also implies that the owner's welfare (net profit) is higher. In comparing the owner's welfare under the budget-based contracts it is, given the discontinuity in pay, necessary to calculate the payments under these contracts and deduct them from firm revenue. We find [empirically] that as long as the revenue per unit exceeds 2.98, then the budget-linear contract maximizes both overall efficiency and the owner's net pay (recall that for performance equal to the budget level, the owner pays 2 per unit in direct labor costs). Third, Panel B of Figure 2 reveals why the two budget level-by-period interaction effects are significant-the decay in group performance is lower under the 75 percent budget level than either the 50 percent budget level or the 100 percent budget level. Again, formal statistical tests support this assertion-the budget level-by-period interaction effect is significant when comparing the 75 percent budget level to either the 50 percent budget level or the 100 percent budget level (both p's Ͻ 0.05). This interaction effect is not statistically significant, however, when comparing the 50 percent budget level and the 100 percent budget level (p Ͼ 0.17).
Finally, Figure 2 shows that the data from the early periods of our experiment are perfectly consistent with our hypotheses. Specifically, in period 1, group performance is highest under the group budget-linear contract, lowest under the group piece-rate contract, and at an intermediate level under the group budget-fixed contract. Additionally, in period 1, group performance increases as the budget level increases. Moreover, ANOVAs and pairwise comparisons conducted using the data from period 1 provide support for all of our hypotheses at ␣ Յ 0.05. It is not until period 3 that performance under the 75 percent budget level exceeds performance under the 100 percent budget level and, for the incentive contracts, until period 4 that performance under the group budget-fixed and group piecerate contracts are [statistically] indistinguishable. Table 2 provides the most comprehensive representation of the data, showing average group performance and budget attainment frequencies by budget level, compensation condition, and period. Similar to Figure 2 , Table 2 reveals that the decay rate in group performance is lowest under the group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level. Table 2 also reveals that budget attainment frequencies are highest under the group budgetlinear contract and the 75 percent budget level. Finally, Table 2 shows that there is virtually no decay in performance under the group budget-linear contract when the budget level is 75 percent (please refer to the shaded portion of Table 2 ).
The initial (period 1) results and accompanying dynamics raise questions regarding why performance is highest, and decays less, under the group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level. For the incentive schemes, both off-equilibrium incentives and linking compensation to budget attainment appear to be important. First, while the two group budget-based contracts we examine contain identical Nash equilibria, the group budgetfixed contract led to lower initial group performance and a larger decay in performance than the group budget-linear contract. We believe this occurs because under the group budget-fixed contract production in excess of the budget target is not compensated, and groups attempt, both initially and over time, to minimize excess production ''errors.'' Specifically, we find that when groups receiving the group budget-fixed contract met or exceeded their budget target, they did so by 27.62 units (30.68 percent) in period 1 and only by 5.91 units (6.25 percent) in period 8. In contrast, when groups receiving the group budget-linear contract met or exceeded their budget target, they did so by 36.17 units (40.18 percent) in period 1 and 33.22 units (34.60 percent) in period 8.
Second, although off-equilibrium incentives appear to be important, so does linking compensation to budget attainment. While the group piece-rate scheme rewards all positive levels of group production, initial performance is much lower under the group piece-rate contract than under either budget-based contract and the decay in performance is greater than under the group budget-linear contract. This appears to occur because, both initially and over time, fewer groups were concerned with meeting their budget target. Specifically, under the group piece-rate contract 15 of 31 groups met or exceeded their budget target in period 1, but only 9 of 32 groups met or exceeded their budget target in period 8. In contrast, under the group budget-linear contract, 26 of 32 groups met or exceeded their budget target in period 1, with this number rising to 27 of 32 groups by period 8. Moreover, participants appear to be responding to the monetary incentives in place under the group
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With regard to budget levels, the 100 percent budget level promoted the highest initial production but also ultimately led more groups to the zero production Nash equilibrium than either the 50 percent budget level or the 75 percent budget level. Specifically, by period 8 of the experiment eight of the 30 groups working under the 100 percent budget level produced 0 units, compared to only 2 groups working under the 50 percent budget level and 1 group working under the 75 percent budget level. Although the average first-period production for these eight groups receiving the 100 percent budget level was 122.5 units, each group missed their budget target in one of the early periods of the experiment, which apparently led them to spiral down to zero production. For the 50 percent budget level, initial performance is lower and the decline in performance is higher than under the 75 percent budget level. Initial performance is lower apparently because the 50 percent budget level requires lower group performance. Although initial performance is lower under the 50 percent budget level than the 75 percent budget level, groups exceeded their performance target in period 1 by an average of 37 units under the 50 percent budget level but only 12 units under the 75 percent budget level (see Table 2 ). Thus, there was more room for groups to reduce ''excess'' production under the 50 percent budget level. As is evidenced by the results under the 100 percent budget level, some room (or slack) appears to be necessary to sustain high group performance, however.
Variance in Work-Time Allocations and Group Performance
Ceteris paribus, organizations prefer lower variability in group performance as lower variance can improve corporate planning and coordination (Hirst and Yetton 1999; Merchant and Manzoni 1989) . Panel A of Table 1 documents that the standard deviation in group performance was lowest under the 75 percent budget level (30.36), followed by the 50 percent budget level (39.32) and the 100 percent budget level (55.07). Panel A of Table 1 also documents that the standard deviation in group performance was lowest under the group budget-linear contract (38.00), followed by the group piece-rate contract (38.43) and the group budget-fixed contract (45.37).
Given the intertemporal dependencies in the data, we examine the variability in performance at the team level. Specifically, we calculate the variance of each team's performance for the eight periods of the experiment and then test for differences (in average team performance variance) across the three budget levels and the three incentive schemes. With regard to budget levels, the variance in team performance was significantly lower under the 75 percent budget level than both the 50 percent budget level (t ϭ 2.74, p Ͻ 0.01) and the 100 percent budget level (t ϭ 2.74, p Ͻ 0.01). With regard to incentive schemes, the variance in team performance was significantly lower under the group budget-linear contract than under the group piece-rate contract (t ϭ 2.06, p Ͻ 0.05). In essence, both motivation and coordination appear to be enhanced by the budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level-i.e., in our setting there does not appear to be a conflict or trade-off between the motivation and planning roles of budgets (cf. Hirst and Yetton 1999, 214) .
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we examine the effects of group budget-based contracts and budget levels (performance targets) on group performance. We compare a group piece-rate contract that rewards all positive levels of group production with two different specifications of a group budget-based contract: (1) a group budget-fixed contract that provides no remuneration for Fisher, Peffer, and Sprinkle 
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Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 performance below the budget and a fixed amount (bonus) for performance meeting or exceeding the budget, and (2) a group budget-linear contract that provides no remuneration for performance below the budget, a fixed amount (bonus) once the budget is attained, plus a piece-rate for production in excess of the budget. We also assigned each group a budget level (performance target), which we set at 50 percent, 75 percent, or 100 percent of the group's performance capability.
The results from our experiment show that the group budget-linear contract led to significantly higher group performance than both the group budget-fixed contract and the group piece-rate contract. The results also show that the 75 percent budget level led to significantly higher group performance than both the 50 percent budget level and the 100 percent budget level. Additionally, both the group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level led to higher budget attainment frequencies and significantly less decay in performance than the other contracts and budget levels. Finally, we found that the variability in work-time allocations and group performance was lowest under the group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level.
The results of our study have several important implications. First, our results demonstrate that certain types of budget-based contracts can result in higher group performance than group piece-rate (e.g., profit-sharing) contracts. This occurs because (in our setting) group piece-rate contracts essentially set up a Prisoner's Dilemma game and monetarily encourage noncooperative behavior and free riding (shirking). While budget-based contracts contain a noncooperative equilibrium, they also include Pareto-superior Nash equilibria that involve positive production. In essence, we find that the discontinuity that exists under budget-based plans motivates group members to cooperate. Thus, consistent with gametheoretic predictions (Holmström 1982) , reciprocity based on self-interest is sustainable under budget-based contracts-such contracts can elicit cooperation without requiring individuals to exhibit concern for others or the welfare of the group as a whole.
However, our results also imply that not all budget-based contracts are superior to all group piece-rate contracts. The group budget-fixed contract did not result in higher performance than the group piece-rate contract even though the group budget-fixed contract contains the same Nash equilibria as the group budget-linear contract. This apparently occurs because the group budget-fixed contract does not compensate production in excess of the budget target-thus, groups apparently attempted to, both initially and over time, minimize excess production above the budget. Such concerns not only led to lower absolute levels of performance, but also to large decays in performance under the group budgetfixed contract. In sum, our results show that, in addition to linking compensation to budget attainment, off-equilibrium incentives also matter. Collectively, these findings are important because they potentially have implications for the design of performance measurement and reward systems in group settings, e.g., the use of budget-based contracts that include offequilibrium payments (see, e.g., Sprinkle 2003; Atkinson et al. 2001) .
Second, our study provides insights into how various budget levels (performance targets) affect group performance. At the individual level, goal-setting research consistently finds a positive relation between goal difficulty and performance (see Locke and Latham 1990 , Chapter 2). However, reliance on others is not germane at the individual level and, at the group level, more difficult goals can impede performance because budget attainment depends on all group members working, and it is difficult for individual group members to buffer against significant deviations of others. In our setting, while the 100 percent budget level motivated the highest initial (period 1) performance, it also led to substantial decays in performance and, ultimately, to numerous groups producing zero output.
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2003 Thus, our findings illustrate an environment in which, for productivity purposes, managerial control systems should set group budgets at moderate rather than easy or difficult levels. In this regard, our results are consistent with Merchant and Manzoni's (1989) field study documenting that budgets empirically tend to be set at intermediate, highly achievable levels. Moreover, in environments such as ours, as the budget level increases, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of achieving the budget decreases while reliance on the uncertain actions of others increases. At the same time, output and compensation also increase under budgetbased contracts as the budget level increases if participants can coordinate on the working equilibrium. Given our parameters, moderate budget targets appear to best balance these opposing forces and, indeed, we find that the average budget attainment frequency of 90 percent under the budget-based contracts and the 75 percent budget level mirrors the attainment frequency reported in Merchant and Manzoni (1989) . Our results at the 100 percent budget level illustrate the potential disadvantages of stretch (i.e., extremely difficult) targets (Thompson et al. 1997) and illustrate how such targets could engender coordination problems and, in turn, decreased performance (Wall Street Journal 2001) .
Finally, our results illustrate how both motivation and coordination (planning) can be enhanced by budget levels of moderate difficulty and group budget-linear contracts. The group budget-linear contract and the 75 percent budget level not only led to the highest level of group performance, but also led to the lowest variability in group performance. To the extent that this result generalizes to other settings, this finding is important because organizations care both about absolute levels of performance and the variability in performance as lower variance can improve corporate planning and coordination (Hirst and Yetton 1999; Merchant and Manzoni 1989) . Moreover, in our setting there does not appear to be, as some have posited (see Hirst and Yetton 1999, 214) , a conflict or trade-off between levels of performance and the variability in performance when assessing the efficacy of various budget difficulty levels.
Certain features of our study reflect important restrictions that may limit the generalizability of our findings-these limitations suggest a number of avenues for further inquiry. First, we did not allow for any interaction between group members, and future research could explore how preplay communication and more formal mutual monitoring mechanisms affect group performance (see Towry 2003) . Second, research examining public goods provision has shown that factors such as group size and incentive strength can affect cooperation (Fisher et al. 1996; Ledyard 1995) . This underscores the importance of examining whether our results generalize to larger groups, alternative sharing mechanisms and, more generally, changes in organizational architecture.
Third, there are a number of differences between our study and the ''prototypical'' study examining the relation between budget (goal) levels and performance, including the group setting (which does not allow for preplay communication), monetary compensation for both budget attainment and perquisite (leisure) consumption, and the repeated nature of our production setting. While we believe our results are driven primarily by coordination problems inherent in a group setting, we did not conduct any experiments at the individual level. We believe it is important for future research to address this shortcoming, in addition to assessing whether our budget level results are robust to alternative production settings, remuneration arrangements, and conceptualizations of budget difficulty.
Finally, we employed a production setting where aggregate output was the sum of individual outputs, and future research might examine the robustness of our results to alternative output specifications. For example, research might consider a sequential production function in which aggregate output is determined by the lowest individual output.
